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In the year 1500, when Portuguese explorers first arrived in what is today known as 
Porto Seguro, Brazil, there were 3 to 4 million indigenous people living in tribes 
across the eastern South American territory. Following both amicable and hostile 
interactions between the Portuguese and the native population, the crown of Portugal 
took possession of the Brazilian territory, and started a process of colonization that 
radically transformed the social landscape of Brazil. From members of politically 
independent semi-nomadic tribes, native Brazilians became a politically subjugated 
and oppressed people (Skidmore 2009). 
Apart from losing their political independence, many native Brazilians were 
murdered, enslaved, expelled from their traditional lands, and forced to covert to the 
Christian faith (Skidmore 2009). The violence became less severe and widespread 
with the creation of an independent Brazilian Republic in 1889, but a full range of 
assimilationist and racist policies still marked the relationship between the Brazilian 
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state and indigenous people for most of the 20th century (Gomes 2003). Today, most 
indigenous Brazilians, among members of other marginalized social groups, struggle 
with the pressures of extractive capitalism, low-paid jobs, low-quality public services, 
and the ill effects of racism (Coimbra Jr and Santos 2000). 
Amidst this tragic history, it is surprising to learn that some Amazonian tribes 
did not become politically or culturally subjugated. These so-called isolated tribes 
have been the subjects of a no-contact policy by the Brazilian government since 1987, 
which prevents any form of contact between members and non-members. Indeed, 
both state officials and members of the general public are legally prevented from 
contacting members of isolated tribes on the grounds that contact would expose 
isolated indigenous persons to dangerous illnesses as well as violate their right to 
“determine their own life processes” (FUNAI 2006). Brazil’s first justification for its 
no-contact policy can be interpreted as either a constraint against serious harm or a 
right to health. The second justification can be interpreted as a variant of a right to 
self-determination.2 
In this essay, I aim to answer the following question: can the Brazilian state 
implement a policy that precludes members of isolated tribes from being contacted by 
non-members without violating core liberal principles? I take it that such a focus on 
liberal principles is warranted here because the Brazilian state regards itself as a 
liberal state under the rule of law (“Estado Liberal de Direito”), and because liberal 
co-citizenship is seen by many contemporary political theorists as an important 
vehicle for the implementation of the ideals of freedom and equality. As Seth Lazar 
puts it, “[s]ubstantive liberalism starts from the obvious premise that each person is of 
great, and equal, moral worth, and aims to establish, on this basis, what we owe to 
each other as a matter of justice—that is, what we can demand from one another, and 
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coercively enforce.” (Lazar 2010, p. 249). In light of this, it becomes important for 
liberal theory to deliver its own verdict about the legitimacy of a public policy that 
affects both the relationship between non-indigenous and indigenous citizens, and the 
degree of freedom each group can exercise in their lives.  
Now, one might think that quite apart from Brazil’s self-conception, this is a 
state that has failed significantly in its attempt to live up to liberal values. Anyone 
who visits Brazil will likely see more evidence of poverty than of a society marked by 
a great degree of personal freedom and social equality (See Power 2016). One might 
also think that the applied question of whether the no-contact policy abides by liberal 
values is simply not worth asking. Philosophers should neither quibble about a 
developing state’s policy agenda, nor focus on specific policies, when attempting to 
uncover the precise meaning of liberal forms of co-citizenship. 
The first concern is unduly uncharitable to Brazil. The second concern is 
unduly charitable to abstract forms of theorizing. Brazil is indeed a state that is 
marked by pockets of severe poverty and human rights violations. But Brazil is also a 
democratic state that has a very progressive liberal constitution, which guarantees, 
among other things, freedom of the press (Art 5 and Art 220), a right to a minimum 
wage (ART 7) and a right to public health care and education (Art 6). And whilst it is 
certainly true that a specific policy aimed at regulating the relationship between 
indigenous and non-indigenous persons cannot give us a full story about the meaning 
of liberal citizenship, it can certainly test the strength of our commitments to freedom 
and equality in the face of competing pressures for cultural preservation and socio-
economic assimilation. I therefore hope that this discussion delivers the following two 
results. First, I hope that the discussion will tells us whether such an unprecedented 
policy can be justified by an appeal to liberal values. Second, I hope that the 
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discussion will make more transparent the precise relationship between liberal 
citizenship and self-determination under non-ideal conditions.3  
The discussion to follow has four parts. In Part I, I briefly describe the no-
contact policy that is currently in force in Brazil, under the auspices of the National 
Indian Foundation (FUNAI), a public body charged with the task of promoting and 
protecting the interests of indigenous peoples in Brazil. In Part II, I note that the 
health costs attached to first contact are not as severe as they were in the past, and that 
this has important implications for the legitimacy of the no-contact policy. In Part III, 
I put pressure on the idea that indigenous peoples are better able to determine their 
own life processes if the state prevents non-members from contacting them. In fact, I 
show that there are good reasons for thinking that such an approach by the state 
actually violates the right of indigenous people to fully shape the content of their 
lives. In Part IV, I survey four other potential liberal justifications for the no-contact 
policy, and show that they fail. The result of the discussion is that there is no liberal 
justification for a public policy that prevents one segment of the population from 
contacting another on the presumption that this best serves the latter’s interests.4  Only 
by rejecting the tenets of liberalism, can the advocates of the no-contact policy make a 




According to FUNAI, there are over a hundred isolated tribes in remote parts of the 
Amazon, some of which have been clearly identified by state officials, and some of 
which are merely presumed to exist. (Funai 2006b). 5 These tribes vary a great deal in 
size, with many tribes appearing to have less than 120 individuals, and only one 
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appearing to have more than 400 members (Walker, Kesler and Hill, 2016). In all 
cases, though, there is a lack of on-going (even if sporadic) contact with members of 
the general public, through the purchase of services, commercial activities and 
tourism. This means that isolated tribes are not even mildly connected to the wider 
web of social, cultural and economic relationships that form the basic structure of 
Brazilian society (FUNAI 2006b).  
Notwithstanding the lack of on-going contact, it is possible that some 
members of isolated tribes are in fact aware of the existence of non-members. This 
could be the result of members having briefly spotted or briefly interacted with non-
isolated indigenous persons or state officials in the past. Indeed, the concept of 
isolation employed here is not mean to suggest that knowledge about outsiders is not 
at all present, but rather to highlight the fact that these tribes find themselves in a 
position where they must meet their basic needs without any support from the state or 
charitable organizations. As one author explains: “They’re an uncontacted tribe in the 
sense that they live without contact with Brazilian national society or contacted tribe. 
We are not saying they’ve never had contact, just that those alive today live without 
it”6 7  
Apart from the remoteness of their geographic position, the main reason why 
such tribes still exist in the Amazon forest can be traced back to 1987, when the 
Brazilian state implemented a comprehensive no-contact policy towards these tribes. 
The policy itself prevents the development of economic activities within the territory 
of isolated tribes, and prevents the arrival and movement of outside goods and 
persons (FUNAI 2006b). Most importantly, the policy expects FUNAI to promote and 
protect the basic rights of isolated indigenous peoples—with a special focus on their 
right to land and its natural resources, their right to health, and their right to culture—
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without engaging in direct contact with them (FUNAI 2006b; CTI 2016).8 Such a 
focus on land, resources, health and culture is inspired by the same liberal values that 
inspired the 1988 Brazilian Constitution. There, indigenous Brazilians are granted a 
right against the state, to maintain their “culture, identity, and way of being (Art 231)” 
(Funai 2006b).  
But to what extent is the Brazilian state uniquely responsible for the isolation 
of so many Amazonian tribes? After all, one might think that these groups have 
clearly expressed their desire to stay isolated and that the policy is simply justified on 
that basis. Although compelling at first glance, this suggestion finds little support in 
the official justification for the no-contact policy, which makes no mention of consent 
on the part of affected tribes. On the contrary, the justification appeals to the 
following two interests: (i) an interest on the part of members of isolated tribes not to 
acquire deadly and debilitating illnesses, and, (ii) an interest on the part of the group 
to determine their own life processes (FUNAI 2006). One would think that if these 
groups had clearly signalled their desire to stay isolated, the Brazilian state would 
simply point to this fact when justifying its policy.9 
It is, however, important to acknowledge that some isolated groups might find 
themselves in isolation due to a conscious decision by its members to avoid contact 
with state officials and members of the general public. There are of course issues of 
cultural translation at play here, and a hostile first interaction could have been a sign 
of fear as opposed to the outcome of a collective decision on the part of members to 
avoid contact with outsiders on an on-going basis. As is to be expected, there is scarce 
empirical evidence bearing on this question, but it is plausible to think that in some 
cases, there has been a clear communication by the group that it does not want any 
form of contact with outsiders (Miller 2013). For such groups, the discussion to 
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follow will not apply. The focus here is indeed on groups that are isolated as a result 
of the no-contact policy.  
So what shall we make of Brazil’s twofold justification for preventing one 
segment of the population from contacting another?10 In the next two sections, I argue 
that both justifications that the Brazilian state has given in support of its policy 
actually grate against the demands of liberal citizenship. Later, I show that other 




The first official rationale for the no-contact policy is that contact between members 
of isolated tribes and outsiders would lead the former to acquire deadly and 
debilitating illness from the latter and this would have devastating effects on their 
health and well-being. The idea here is that indigenous persons have suffered a great 
deal from first contact in the past, and that such suffering should be avoided by a 
comprehensive state-led policy of no-contact. 
To begin with, there is no denying that indigenous people’s health has suffered 
a great deal from first contact in the past, especially during the colonial era. However, 
the empirical claim behind this justification has recently been challenged by 
anthropologists Robert S. Walker and Kim R. Hill. In a polemic editorial in the 
journal Science, Walker and Hill argue that contact can in fact be carried out without 
exposing members of isolated tribes to deadly and debilitating illnesses (2015). They 
also argue that most isolated tribes in the Amazon are in fact heading towards 
extinction, and that this is partly due to the health threats they face under conditions 
of isolation.  
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Walker and Hill’s major criticism of the no-contact policy is that it is based on 
a pessimistic and ill informed understanding of the health effects that follow a fully 
planned first contact between isolated tribes and government officials. To back up this 
claim, they point to evidence showing that if first contact takes place with the support 
of well-trained and well-resourced health care professionals, the mortality rate can be 
close to zero (Walker and Hill 2015; Walker, Kesler and Hill 2016). Even more 
strongly, Walker and Hill suggest that the health of members of isolated tribes can be 
at greater risk in case of unplanned contact with members of the general public. This 
is because unplanned contact necessarily takes place without rapid response by health 
care professionals, and such response is essential in cases where isolated tribes are 
exposed to pathogens that they are not immune to. As they explain: “well-designed 
contact can be quite safe, compared to the disastrous outcomes from accidental 
contacts. But safe contact requires a qualified team of cultural translators and health 
care professionals that is committed to staying on site for more than a year” (Walker 
and Hill 2015). 
As I see it, Walker and Hill are correct in putting pressure on the legitimacy of 
the non-contact policy by critically assessing its empirical component. For if the no-
contact policy is partly justified on the assumption that first contact necessarily leads 
to disastrous outcomes, then it certainly matters that the empirical evidence tells us 
otherwise.11 Notwithstanding the lack of empirical evidence for the strong claim that 
first contact necessarily leads to disastrous outcome, there is a weaker claim which is 
immune to the empirical evidence. The idea here is that the no-contact policy protects 
isolated tribes from being foreseeably exposed to illnesses that lead to a great loss of 
well-being.  
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This is undoubtedly a more promising justification, but it is one that would 
still depend on the balance of health costs and benefits that comes with fist contact. 
This is because among liberal states, Brazil employs one of the most generous 
interpretations of what a right to health amounts to and has affirmed a right to health 
care for its citizenry in both law and practice (Galvão 2005). And once we understand 
the right to health as one that gives rise to both negative and positive obligations on 
the part of the state, then this line of justification becomes dependent on a cost/benefit 
analysis. For there can arguably be a number of threats to the health of isolated 
indigenous persons which would in fact require state intervention in the form of 
health care services. The rate of maternal and child death could be so high in those 
tribes, for instance, that state intervention would lead to less death, less disability, and 
less loss of well-being, overall.  
In sum, the cogency of appealing to the health effects of contact for the 
justification of the no-contact policy depends on the expected costs and benefits 
attached to first contact, and those attached to a lack of contact. If Walker and Hill are 
correct about the low risk of serious harm attached to the former, then that takes away 
much of the force of this first line of justification (At most, an appeal to the health 
costs attached to contact provides the Brazilian state with a consideration against 
intervention under conditions where it lacks appropriate medical technology and 
personnel).12  
But what about a right to determine one’s life processes? Does this right 
justify the Brazilian state’s policy of keeping indigenous people in a position of 





At first glance, a no-contact policy seems like the perfect antidote to a colonial history 
that has robbed so many indigenous people from enjoying the status and benefits of 
collective self-determination. 13  Given the history of violent contact between 
indigenous people and non-indigenous people in South America, one might 
reasonably worry that any kind of interference, no matter how respectful and 
autonomy-promoting, would fail to respect the right of isolated tribes to determine 
their own life processes.  
 There is no denying that colonialism was deeply unjust, and that the Brazilian 
state must do all it can to address the harmful effects of this past injustice and to 
protect the core rights of indigenous people, such as their right to land, health and 
culture. However, the no-contact policy is not tremendously distinct from a civilizing 
form of colonialism, whereby colonizers impose, without consultation, a given socio-
political arrangement on their colonies because they take such an arrangement to be to 
the colony’s benefit. Indeed, both civilizing colonizers and the architects of the no-
contact policy have refrained from consulting indigenous peoples about the political 
arrangements and decisions that directly affect their lives, and have instead proceeded 
as if they know best what indigenous people are owed as a matter of social justice 
(Ypi 2013; Stilz 2015. See also Goodin 2007). Such blatant paternalism towards a 
segment of the population cannot be easily reconciled with the liberal ideal that all 
persons are free and equal. 
 To better see what is at stake, we must disambiguate between the different 
senses of collective self-determination in the liberal tradition. Once we see what is 
valuable about liberal self-determination, we will be in a better position to see why it 
cannot justify the no-contact policy. 
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 Contemporary liberal political theorists working on self-determination 
typically distinguish two understandings of self-determination: a collective right to 
secede and a collective right to political autonomy (Wellman 2005; Kymlicka 2010). 
Whereas the first presupposes a right to one’s own territory and political institutions 
in the form of one’s own state, the second only entails a right to an additional degree 
of political freedom vis-à-vis self-regarding affairs and in comparison with fellow 
members of society. This means that both members of a state and members of a 
politically autonomous region within a state will enjoy self-determination, albeit of a 
different kind. They will also both enjoy political autonomy but will do so to a 
different degree. One could also capture these two senses of self-determination by 
claiming that self-determination always entails a right to collective political 
autonomy, but in that in some cases, that right is so strong that it gives members a 
right to form (or maintain) their own state.  
 As mentioned above, the Brazilian state partly justifies its no-contact policy 
by appealing to the importance of indigenous people determining their own life 
processes. However, it neither believes that isolated tribes should form their own state 
nor that these tribes should count as a politically autonomous region, whose collective 
decisions feeds into Brazilian law and policy-making. This suggests that the Brazilian 
state has a different understanding of self-determination in mind, one where collective 
autonomy is realized through a lack of day-to-day interference by outsiders.14 The 
question then is: what is the actual relationship between self-determination and 
government-led isolation? The Brazilian state sees it as a positive relationship when it 
comes to indigenous persons. The more isolated the tribe, the more self-determining 
their members are. I am going to argue, however, that if we start with liberal 
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assumptions about the moral equality of persons and their right to be free from 
paternalism, the relationship actually goes the other way. 
 The problem is this: self-determination and isolation are not co-extensive. A 
group can be highly politically autonomous without being isolated. Think here of the 
Quebecois in Canada.15 This is a highly autonomous political group of Canadian 
citizens but one that is not economically, socially and culturally self-sufficient. In 
fact, the Quebecois use their political autonomy to engage in economic relationships 
with other regions of Canada, and to interact at the cultural level with fellow 
Francophone nations. It is true that Quebec could use its political autonomy to 
become more self-sufficient, and so to engage in less trade and cultural exchange. But 
it is also true that they could choose to become even more economically and 
culturally integrated within the wider Canadian society, and the world at large. In 
either case, they would be making their own decision about their own political future, 
and so would be exercising their right to self-determination qua right to collective 
political autonomy. 
 The opposite is true of isolated tribes. It is true that they are radically isolated, 
and that their economic, social and cultural life takes place without any influence 
whatsoever from the outside world. The problem is that such isolation is not a result 
of a conscious decision made by members of the collective to lead life in an extreme 
form of self-sufficiency (save of course in the cases discussed earlier which might 
have involved some form of consent). Instead, isolation here is the direct result of the 
paternalistic decision made on the part of the Brazilian state not to contact and not let 
anyone else contact these tribes. It is as if Quebec was a by-product of a decision 
made by the Canadian state to prevent Anglophone entrance and interference in 
Quebec so that Francophone citizens would enjoy complete cultural, social, and 
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economic independence. While we can cogently claim that this alternative Quebec 
would be radically self-sufficient, it would be deeply problematic to claim that they 
were in fact self-determining.  
 It is important to emphasize that I am not claiming that self-determination and 
self-sufficiency are mutually exclusive. One can easily imagine an arrangement 
whereby previously isolated indigenous Brazilians would consider all their options, 
and then ask the state to enforce a non-interference policy. We can further imagine 
that such an arrangement would allow for future generations to also make their own 
decision as to whether or not they would like to continue in a position of isolation. In 
such case, current and future generations of isolated tribes would be directing their 
own future, and not having self-sufficiency imposed on them from the outside—
although, of course, the isolation in question would involve sporadic contact between 
indigenous persons and state officials, and would not be of the more radical kind 
where a binding decision in favour of isolation is made by a current generation on 




In the previous two sections we examined the official twofold justification offered by 
the Brazilian government for the no-contact policy and have seen that they both fail. 
The question for this section is: could there be other considerations that appeal to 
liberal values and yet deliver the result that a non-contact policy is in fact legitimate? 
 One consideration is that contact between members of isolated tribes and non-
members could potentially lead to social harm. Indeed, it seems like the Brazilian 
state could appeal instead to the right of indigenous persons not to suffer the effects of 
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marginalization and oppression, which are the likely consequences of their coming 
into contact with state officials and members of the general public. As one 
commentator explains: “Disease is the first threat, followed later by individuals’ 
despair caused by disruption of everything that is precious to life, leading to 
alcoholism, unemployment, family breakdown, early death. (Miller 2013, p. 44).” The 
Brazilian state could therefore claim that if there is a choice to be made between lack 
of self-determination of the part of the collective and socio-economic marginalization 
on the part of individuals, it must choose the former.  
 There are two problems with this strategy. First, it is not obvious that the only 
two futures available to indigenous people in Brazil are socio-economic 
marginalization or lack of collective self-determination. Some state policies and 
programs seem to have been successful in integrating consenting indigenous 
Brazilians into the larger economy and providing them with basic public services and 
socio-economic opportunities (Garfield 2001). But even if it is true that the Brazilian 
state is utterly incapable of promoting and protecting the socio-economic rights of its 
indigenous population, this would still not justify the no-contact policy. When 
presented with facts about life outside Amazon, some members of isolated tribes 
might well endorse the current arrangement as a way of avoiding ending up at the 
bottom of the Brazilian social hierarchy (or due to genuine pro-attitudes towards 
isolation), but some might still choose to exercise their liberal right to exit by leaving 
the tribe, or their right to self-determination by collectively deciding against isolation 
(Raz 2017, 45). Treating persons as free and equal requires respecting their right to 
make their own choices about their personal and political lives, even when those 
choices fail to track what we think to be in their best interests. 
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 There is an additional strategy available to the Brazilian state, however. The 
strategy here is to deny the charge of paternalism and to claim that state officials are 
simply adopting a conservative policy of risk aversion and not encouraging 
indigenous persons to remain self-sufficient. Because Brazil does not actively prevent 
members of isolated tribes from leaving their traditional land and exploring the 
options afforded by the larger Brazilian society, it is not actually violating their liberal 
right to exit and reducing the degree of personal and political autonomy they can 
exercise in their lives. State officials might also point out that although it is 
unfortunate that isolated indigenous people are likely to be ignorant of the fact that 
they are citizens of a state that provides a range of services and opportunities to its 
citizens, including a right to political participation, it is still not the job of the state to 
address such state of ignorance.   
  A lot here depends on how we interpret the liberal right to exit. It seems 
plausible to think that citizens of minority groups should have important information 
about the larger society made available to them so they can decide for themselves 
whether to stay in the minority group or to leave it (see Kymlicka 1989). But even if a 
liberal right to exit is not violated by the non-contact policy, Brazil’s approach to 
isolated tribes still amounts to an impermissible form of paternalism. Because 
autonomy violations take place by both actions and omissions, liberals should be wary 
of a state that makes high-stake decision on behalf of some of its citizens without 
consulting or informing them because it presumes to have a superior ability in 
tracking their interests (Shiffrin 2000).  
To be sure, this sort of paternalism by omission is not as explicit as classic 
forms of paternalism involving coercion, but is no less disrespectful of human beings 
qua autonomous agents (Ibid; Raz 1986). Indeed, just like classical forms of 
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paternalism, paternalism by omission involves an agent who imposes her will and has 
it exert control on another agent because of their presumed superior ability in tracking 
one or more of the other agent’s interests. This is why it is (say) paternalistic for a 
manager not to inform a female member of his team about opportunities for 
promotion on the grounds that as a woman, she would deal with a great deal of sexism 
were she to come up through the ranks. Similarly, it is paternalistic for the Brazilian 
state to refrain from contacting indigenous tribes on the ground that isolation best 
serves their individual and collective interests.  
A third strategy in support of the no-contact policy is to deny that members of 
isolated tribes count as Brazilian citizens. The idea here is that the right of isolated 
tribes to self-determination entails a right to their own territory and/or political 
institutions, and that in the same way that the Brazilian state does no wrong when it 
refrains from contacting citizens from Venezuela at the northern border, it does no 
wrong in not contacting members of isolated tribes.  
 There is both an empirical and a normative version of this response. The 
empirical version clearly does not work since Brazil employs a principle of jus soli 
for citizenship allocation that automatically applies to members of isolated tribes. 
Moreover, the state legislates about isolated tribes and makes all sorts of policy 
decisions under the assumption that members of isolated tribes are citizens despite 
their isolation.16 
 The more interesting point here is the one that would see isolated tribes as 
entitled to self-determination in the strong sense, as either entitled to their own state 
or having a greater degree of political autonomy.  Neither of these routes can justify 
the no-contact policy, however. If isolated tribes have a right to their own state, then 
Brazil lacks the legitimacy of preventing non-citizens from entering the territory of 
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another nation, even it could somehow justify a violation of the right of Brazilian 
citizens to exit their own state.17 But if we think that isolated indigenous peoples 
should enjoy a greater degree of autonomy than their fellow citizens vis-à-vis self-
regarding affairs, then we are back to the problem that isolation does not allow for the 
sort of consultation and collective decision-making which typically marks the 
relationship between national government and politically autonomous region within 
the state. Saying that isolated indigenous tribes form a politically autonomous region 
is like saying that Quebec would count as a politically autonomous region even if they 
had been created by Anglophone citizens through a no-contact policy. 
 A final line of justification appeals to the liberal right of indigenous persons to 
collective flourishing, culturally understood. The worry here is that first contact can 
not be reversed, and some ways of life might become impossible after contact and 
consultation. This is why anthropologists Walker and Hill are critical of the no-
contact policy only as it pertains to tribes that are under serious danger of extinction 
due to the presumed low number of members. For tribes that appear to be doing well, 
Walker and Hill agree that the no-contact policy best serve their interests (2015). 
It is certainly important to be explicit about the fact that even the most 
respectful variant of exchange between members of isolated tribes and state officials 
will mark the end of the cultural uniqueness of these groups. But here we must ask 
ourselves: who exactly has an interest in isolating one culture so that it is not 
influenced by another? Whilst some might bemoan the end of the cultural uniqueness 
that comes with first contact between indigenous persons and state officials, the 
liberal state cannot restrict important liberal freedoms, such as freedom from 
paternalism and a right to political participation, in order to prevent it from 
happening.18 Instead, what the liberal state owes all its citizens is to place them in a 
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position where they can make meaningful decisions about their personal lives and 
their collective political future. Some of these decisions might well be about the 
importance of cultural preservation. But they could also be about the importance of 
cultural integration. The burden is on the Brazilian state to show that the preservation 
of culture can come at the cost of individual freedom and social equality. Until then, 
liberals should interpret a commitment to liberal values as a commitment to treating 
persons as ends in themselves and not as means to the maintenance of the cultural 
uniqueness of some groups in society.  
Before I conclude the discussion, let me note that I am well aware of the 
constraints the Brazilian state would face were it to contact and consult isolated tribes 
about their individuals and collective aspirations. Indeed, I can certainly imagine how 
deeply unsettling it would be for members of isolated tribes to first learn about the 
cultural and social norms that govern the larger Brazilian society, as well as foresee 
the economic and religious forces that would attempt to take advantage of the fact that 
isolated indigenous persons would take time to learn about their rights and 
entitlements. This is why contact would only be justified if it could be carried out by 
(well-trained and well-resourced) health care professionals and public officials who 
understand the importance of empowering indigenous persons to make their own 
personal and political decisions, as well as resist unwelcoming pressures for cultural, 
religious and economic assimilation. Given the current political instability in Brazil, 
and the high levels of corruption among members of the legislature, it is unlikely that 
Brazil will soon find itself in a position where a contact policy would in fact be 
morally justified. This leaves Brazil in the awkward position whereby any of its 
approach to isolated tribes will be morally problematic. A policy of isolation is 
illegitimate from a liberal point of view, but contact under non-ideal conditions is all-
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things-considered unjustified. The only way out for Brazil and the supporters of the 
non-contact policy is to reject the tenants of liberalism that give rise to the dilemma in 




I began this discussion with the intention of making progress on the following two 
questions relating to Brazil’s no-contact policy: the applied question of whether such 
an unprecedented policy could be justified by an appeal to liberal values; and the 
theoretical question of how liberal citizenship and self-determination interact under 
non-ideal conditions.   
 I hope it is clear by now that the answer to the first question is negative. If we 
start with the liberal ideals of freedom and equality, then we lack the theoretical 
resources to defend a policy whereby one segment of the population is prevented from 
contacting another due to a judgment on the part of the state that isolation best serve 
the interests of those left uncontacted. Indeed, a state-led policy of isolation could 
only be rendered legitimate if it posed a threat to life or liberty or if it was a result of a 
collective decision by members of isolated tribes not to engage in any form of 
integration with the wider society.  
 But what about the second question? Does the case of isolated tribes actually 
put us in a better position to uncover the meaning of liberal forms of citizenship? I 
believe it does. Recall that liberal citizenship starts with the assumption that all 
members of the state should be treated as free and equal. Moreover, a liberal state is a 
state charged with the promotion and protection of citizens’ basic human rights, 
including a right to culture, identity and a way of being. In the abstract these 
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commitments are understood to be mutually supportive, but the Amazonian case 
shows that they can easily come apart. Indeed, the Brazilian state can only treat 
members of isolated tribes as free and equal by consulting them about how they hope 
to lead their lives, and yet, once consultation takes place, the cultural or identity 
choice of continuing being uncontacted by the state is no longer possible. Liberal 
citizenship therefore precludes uncontacted ways of live because contact between 
citizens and the state turns out to be necessary for the realization of the liberal ideals 
of freedom and equality. This is either bad news for Brazil’s liberal credentials, or for 
liberalism more generally.   
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Maiara Cardoso, Stephanie Collins, Ryan Cox, Annelien De Dijn, Holly Lawford-
Smith, Liam Shields, and the audiences at the Figure of the Citizen workshop and the 
JSI seminar at the University of Sydney.   
2  In official documents and bulletins, the language of self-determination 
(autodeterminação) is used interchangeable with the idea of control over one’s life 
processes (CTI 2016). In section III, we will examine in more detail the relationship 
between control over one’s life processes and self-determination. 
3 This should be of interest to those who believe that non-ideal theory plays an 
important role in testing the strength and scope of the abstract principles that typically 
emerge from ideal forms of theorizing (Valentini 2009; 2012). 
4 This is not to suggest that this question could not be assessed via communitarian or 
realist lenses. The question of whether this form of isolation is legitimate might be 
answered differently depending on which principles of justice or legitimacy one 
theorises with. My purpose here is, however, to engage in an internal critique of the 
Brazilian liberal project. 
5 FUNAI primarily employs the following mechanisms for locating and monitoring 
isolated tribes: field trips, archival research, reconnaissance flights, and analysis of 
satellite image (CTI 2016). 
6 David Hill from Survival International being interviewed by Hearn 2008, p. 2. 
7 It is possible that previous generations of many such isolated tribes will have 
intentionally isolated themselves to avoid the effects of colonialism and the 
assimilationist policies of the first part of the 20th Century. This does not mean, 
however, that current generations have meaningfully consented to their isolation.  	
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8 Note that FUNAI has a special organ charged with task of implementing the no-
contact policy: the Coordenação Geral de Índios Isolados e Recém Contatados 
(CGIIRC). For an overview of this body, see CTI 2016.  
9 Note that isolated tribes in other South-American states also fall outside the scope of 
the discussion (unless they find themselves in the Brazilian territory for a significant 
part of their lives).  
10 Another assumption in the discussion is that these are not tribes that violate the 
basic human rights of its own members. Here I follow Lantz Miller (2013) in thinking 
that liberal states should give minority groups the benefit of the doubt, and assume 
that they do not engage in slavery, mass rape, and torture, unless there is strong 
evidence to the contrary. I also assume that such evidence can be gathered by the use 
of reconnaissance flights and field trips. See supra note 3. 
11 To be sure, it may well be that there are problems with the empirical studies 
employed by Walker and Hill, and that first contact continues to be extremely risky. 
Whether or not this means that the non-contact policy can be justified will again 
depend on the risks attached to a lack of contact. At any rate, in order to successfully 
justify its non-contact policy, the Brazilian state needs to provide empirical evidence 
that defeats Walker and Hill’s contention that first contact is less dangerous than lack 
of contact.  
12 I do not mean to deny that a right against harm should figure as a moral constraint 
on any policy on the part of the state towards any of its citizens. I also do not mean to 
suggest that health care interventions should take place without the consent of 
indigenous populations. The claim here is simply that, as it stands, the first 
justification fails.  
13 Here I assume that collective autonomy or group self-determination is valuable both 
for the role it plays in facilitating political agency (and the realization of justice that is 
dependent on it), and in expanding the degree of autonomy people can exercise in 
their personal lives.  
14 See supra note 1. 
15 We might think that the analogy involving Quebec does not tell us anything 
meaningful about isolation and paternalism because the Quebecois share an European 
identity with the larger Canadian society. For those who think that it is the shared 
European values which are doing the work in driving intuitions against forced 
isolation, we can change the case slightly so that Quebec is not formed by 
Francophone citizens, but by indigenous groups, and that it was formed by 
Anglophone Canadians without consulting and through a no-contact policy. I take it 
that we reach the same result here: if we start with liberal principles, we reach the 
conclusion that it would be paternalistic for Anglophone Canadians to implement 
such a policy towards the indigenous population inhabiting the Canadian territory. I 
thank a reviewer for raising this concern. 
16 One might think that despite Brazil’s endorsement of Jus Soli, isolated persons 
might be owed some rights of citizenship without being entitled to the status of 
citizen. Although it might be true that some groups of denizens should be given many 
of the rights of citizenship without necessarily being entitled to citizenship, the 
presumption should always be in favour of full and equal citizenship unless there is a 
very compelling reason in favour of semi-citizenship. The aim of the essay is 
precisely to show that there is no liberal justification for treating isolated indigenous 
persons as semi-citizens. For a discussion of semi-citizenship, see Cohen 2009. 	
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17 Some philosophers deny that there is in fact an unconditional or prima facie right to 
exit one’s own state and that a liberal state can in fact prevent their citizens from 
emigrating. For a discussion, see Ypi (2008). Note thought that even if a denial of a 
right to exit by the state can in fact be squared with liberal principles, this would still 
not legitimatize the no-contact policy since Brazil prevents both Brazilian citizens and 
foreign nationals from entering into the territory of isolated tribes.  
18See Will Kymlicka (1989; 2001) for the claim that liberal principles impose 
constraints on the actions of both minority and majority groups within a liberal 
society.  Note that I am neither constraining myself to Kymlicka’s own liberal theory 
of minority rights, nor suggesting that he would agree with everything I say in this 
essay.  
19 The aim of the essay was not to justify liberalism, but to ask what the implications 
are of taking both liberalism and the rights of indigenous persons seriously. As it 
becomes clear, if we thinks that a right against cultural change counts as a core 
indigenous right, then one might have to abandon its commitments to liberalism. 
Similarly, if one takes liberal values as non-negotiable, then we must concede that the 
non-contact policy is in fact illegitimate. For a compelling critique of liberalism’s 
ability to do justice to indigenous persons, see Coulthard (2014); Simpson (2014). For 
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